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Vermont outlined the problem succinctly: "Discharge into the community without planning or supervision is likely to result in a repetition of the cycle of violent offense, incarceration, overt signs of mental illness in jail, commitment, and reduced or largely absent signs of mental illness in the hospital which has marked [the defendant's] adult life." 3 Just three years ago, a student note came to the same conclusions, noting that members of this cohort "continue to cycle in and out of mental hospitals." 4 Likewise, earlier this year former President Barack Obama noted the existence of "a relatively small number of highly vulnerable individuals [who] cycle repeatedly not just through local jails, but also hospital emergency rooms, shelters, and other public systems." 5 In short, the way we criminalize behavior that disproportionally affects people with mental illness is a problem that has not gone away, and is one that any of us who take seriously the entire bundle of issues that are raised by this phenomenon-how we treat this population; how we fail to learn from our history of failure; how we ignore options that might potentially ameliorate the underlying situation; how we demand quick fixes, and ignore the "long game"-must take equally seriously. 6 This shuttling or cycling is bad for many reasons, not least of which is the way that it deprives the cohort of individuals at risk from any meaningful continuity of care and how it exacerbates the problems caused by the unnecessary and counterproductive arrests of persons with mental disabilities for as well as the basic principles of international human rights law, and argue for the enhanced use of mental health courts. We conclude by offering some suggestions that, we believe, will ameliorate the current situation.
Our title comes from Bob Dylan's brilliant song, Visions of Johanna, 18 and comes from this couplet: "The peddler now speaks to the countess who's pretending to care for him/ Sayin', 'Name me someone that's not a parasite and I'll go out and say a prayer for him '" 19 Visions of Johanna is universally seen as one of Dylan's greatest songs, an "undisputed master-work," according to eminent Dylanologist Oliver Trager. 20 In part, the song is about nightmares and hallucinations. 21 This couplet has been characterized by as a reflection of Dylan's "hunger for the authentic,"
22 although the countess figure demonstrates only a "pretense of care." 23 We chose this-admittedly, ambiguous-lyric to use in our article title for several reasons: first, the economic and social status contrast between the "peddler" and the "countess" parallels the contrast between the status of the marginalized persons of whom we write 24 and the power of the state; second, we believe that our rejection of the importance of continuity of care demonstrates the reality that the state is only "pretending to care" for those of whom we write; and third, this population is seen, unfortunately, as "parasit [ic] ," and thus, of less value than others. 24. It should be no surprise to any reader that US incarceration policies, in this specific context as in others, have a disproportionate impact on other marginalized populations-African-Americans and Latinos. See Nicholas Freudenberg, Jails, Prisons, and the Health of Urban Populations: A Review of the Impact of the Correctional System on Community Health, 78 J. URB. HEALTH 214, 214-15 (2001) .
25. In one analysis of Visions, a critic has connected the song to George Jackson, a "naturalistic tale of fury that recounts the prison death of Jackson, a Black Panther who
We have chosen to write this article in an effort to make it more likely that the population about which we are concerned will be seen as having the same value as all others, and that policies (both official and unwritten) be restructured so as to provide the level of clinical care needed by this population in ways that comport with constitutional, statutory, and international human rights law, and with the precepts of therapeutic jurisprudence.
II. ON CONTINUITY OF CARE

A. Introduction
As previously stated, the concept of continuity of care includes continuity of control, of services, of program content, of social environment, and of attachment. 26 It requires re-entry preparation, the creation of community linkages, and insurance that the required services will be delivered. 27 There is no question that the lack of continuity of mental health services 28 severely impairs the ability of community-based mental health providers to have any therapeutic impact on this population. 29 Henry Dlugacz and Luna Droubi state the problem succinctly: "While incarcerated, many of these people received inadequate treatment and deficient, if any, reentry planning. Once released to the was a major figure in radical racial politics in the late 1960s, and whose prison letters evidenced the systemic racist brutality of the American prison system." Michael L. Perlin Failures in treatment are frequently attributed, at least in part, to discontinuity 31 and to lack of coordination. 32 There is little consistency in approach, and there is a lack of understanding as to the scope of protections that must be provided. 33 For years, both the prevalence of medical errors arising in cases in which there discontinuity of care 34 and the fact that our incarceration policies have had unintended adverse health consequences have been wellknown. 35 The range of negative outcomes includes, but is not limited to, having no permanent residence post-release and a suicide rate eight times higher than the general population. 36 It is indisputable that there is a positive impact when models of care are in place, 37 and that such models improve postrelease engagement with mental health services. 38 There is now widespread agreement that transition planning is essential to facilitating continuity of care for soon-to-be released inmates with 39 and that correctional systems can have a "direct effect" on the health of urban populations by linking inmates to urban services after release. 40 Of course, forensic practitioners will need new skills to make sure that continuity is in fact provided. 41 Additionally, it goes without saying that implementation requires "political and constituent support and investment of resources."
42
B. Role of Correctional Facilities
Correctional facilities must engage in clinically-oriented reentry programs. 43 In addition to access to health care services, as part of a successful re-entry program, ex-prisoners must also have access to meaningful peer mentoring programs, 44 supported employment, and supported housing. 45 As Henry Dlugacz has stressed, successful reentry programs-programs that are collaborative as between the criminal justice system and the behavioral health system 46 -must be a "primary focus of correctional mental health care, [and] 
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organizations to support systemic change to make the success of such intervention-based programs more likely.
49
For such programs to be successful, initially there must be a critical assessment of the mental health services typically available in a correctional institution, 50 an assessment that must be carried out in light of the "overarching resistance to considering rehabilitation" as a primary goal of corrections.
51 Dlugacz and a colleague note ruefully that this attitude contributes to the "isolation" that care providers in correctional settings often experience, and that it further "reinforces the disconnection of care and inadequate attention to clinically oriented reentry programs in clinical settings." 52 Moreover, a proper assessment of the needs of inmates in this context requires an "interdisciplinary and integrated approach that includes the active participation of the individual, custody staff, family and treatment providers."
53
Only in this way can we ever actualize this "core function" of correctional mental health. .6 million adults in the U.S. reportedly suffered from "any mental illness" ("AMI"), of whom 9.8 million suffered from "serious mental illness" ("SMI")).
56 
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A. Impacts of Deinstitutionalization 63
Deinstitutionalization refers not just to the release and reduction in numbers of persons who are institutionalized in psychiatric hospitals, but also to the "diversion of potential new admissions to alternative facilities, and the development of special services for the care of a noninstitutionalized mentally ill population." 64 It was spurred by technological advancements in drug therapy, economic incentives to shift care to communitybased outpatient facilities, and changing societal attitudes regarding mental illness. 65 Several landmark Supreme Court cases guaranteed due process protections for persons with mental illness, applying the due process and equal protection clauses to institutionalization in psychiatric institutions, 66 ruling it unconstitutional to indefinitely civilly commit a person without a finding of dangerousness 67 and articulating a right to the least restrictive alternative in institutionalization decision-making. 68 Other federal courts have guaranteed the right to treatment 69 and the right to refuse treatment. 70 Deinstitutionalization is often seen as the reason for the current state of affairs; 71 yet the greatest problems stem from the lack of adequate and accessible community resources for persons with mental illness. 72 This has led to many people with mental illness becoming homeless, 73 and thus easily jailed for minor offenses such as trespassing, disturbing the peace, or disorderly conduct. 74 Further, police may be more inclined to use the criminal justice process over the civil commitment process because medical providers may refuse to civilly commit someone or release the person in a short period of time. In contrast, the criminal justice system is much more onerous and, in some instances, almost guarantees a longer period where the person is not in the community. 75 Police also use these tactics because it is easier and quicker for them to do so, 76 and because of stereotypical beliefs 77 mind, and spirit." "Self-determination" often means merely that the person has a choice of soup kitchens. The "least restrictive setting" frequently turns out to be a cardboard box, a jail cell, or a terror-filled existence plagued by both real and imaginary enemies. Id. On this point, we endorse the conclusions of Professor Samuel Bagenstos that "deinstitutionalization has been a success in many significant respects." Samuel R. 
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that persons with mental disabilities cannot be reasoned with and are incapable of conducting a meaningful conversation.
78
Another factor to consider is the privatization of the mental health system. 79 Managed care has restricted what services are covered including psychotropic medication as well as medical benefits that are typically lost when a person with mental illness is incarcerated. 80 While psychiatric hospitals have fewer beds today, the largest mental health facilities are now found in urban jails in Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago. 81 It is necessary to consider all of this in the context of the research done by Professor Jennifer Skeem and her colleagues, who recommend three policy priorities: (1) identifying offenders for whom mental illness directly causes criminal behavior; (2) identifying "evidence-based corrections," including, isolating "the ingredients of existing programs that reduce recidivism;" and (3) assessing and addressing system bias, whether this bias is "motivated by fear or paternalism."
82 By identifying these key areas, unnecessary incarceration and institutionalization for persons with mental illness can be avoided.
B. Conditions of Confinement
Persons with mental disabilities are disproportionately involuntarily committed to institutions where they are deprived of their freedom, dignity, and basic human rights. 83 Even in the United States, persons with mental disabilities are still frequently housed in institutions that shock the conscience and humiliate those incarcerated there. 84 This isolation leads to feelings of shame and can discourage treatment. 85 Institutional settings include not just psychiatric hospitals, but also adult homes, nursing homes, and prisons. 86 The process of transferring individuals from psychiatric hospitals to such other facilities is known as "transinstitutionalization," which can be defined as "the transfer of a population from one institutional system to another as an inadvertent consequence of policies intended to deinstitutionalize the target population."
87
Prisons and jails are often not properly equipped to handle persons with mental disabilities because they were never meant to function as mental health facilities. 88 They are "crippled by understaffing, insufficient facilities, limited programs, and the restrictions imposed on them by prison rules and prison culture." 89 In many instances, prisoners with mental illness who refuse to comply with orders are subject to physical force such as chemical sprays, electric shocks, and long-term physical restraints. 90 Inmates with mental health conditions are at a higher risk of being victims of violence and displaying more violent behavior compared to inmates without disabilities.
91 "The absence of timely and effective reasonable accommodations, as well as the lack of effective communications and physical accessibility, significantly increases the likelihood of present and future injury and illness facing prisoners with disabilities." 92 The shame that these individuals experience as a result of the loss of their rights and liberties is rarely, if ever, discussed even though it is readily 84 
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acknowledged after the fact by individuals who have faced these circumstances.
93
The policies implemented in jails and prisons have both direct and indirect consequences on urban communities. 94 The results include reduced employability of young men, precipitated homeless, destabilized neighborhoods, disrupted family life, all leading to disenfranchisement and negatively impacted mental health. 95 Providing appropriate mental health treatment in jails and prisons can reduce the negative impacts of incarceration by "[1] minimizing mental health problems suffered as a result of incarceration; [2] minimizing conflicts among inmates and between inmates and correctional staff; and [3] reducing substantially the post-release risk for recidivism of inmates with serious mental disorders."
96
C. New York Policies As an Example
We turn here to the situation in New York, as that state is a good example of what happens when continuity of care issues emerge, despite the best efforts of some state and city agencies to prevent the cycle in question. The issues in New York are not unique, as the same issues persistently arise in other jurisdictions throughout the country. 97 We will look at New York through the filter of a recent case (partially litigated by one of the co-authors, Naomi M. Weinstein) that illustrates the problems of continuity of care. Billy 98 was a patient in a long-term state psychiatric hospital. While at the unit, he assaulted a staff member, and was given a desk appearance ticket. 99 Two months later, Billy was arraigned on the misdemeanor assault charge. For the first criminal court appearance, Billy was brought to the state trial court in the custody of hospital peace officers and was returned to the hospital thereafter. At Billy's next court appearance, he "acted out" in court, 100 and the judge remanded him to jail instead of returning him to the custody of the state hospital.
101 While in jail, Billy decompensated (he stopped taking his psychiatric medication and began exhibiting symptoms of his mental illness including displaying paranoia and aggressive behaviors). During this time he was waiting for an evaluation to determine whether he was competent to stand trial.
Eventually, Billy was transferred to the jail psychiatric ward where he was treated with medication over his objection.
102 Over the course of several months, Billy was evaluated twice to determine if he was competent to stand trial. 103 Consequently, he was found incompetent to stand trial, and his misdemeanor assault 100. Billy allegedly tried to reach for a court officer's weapon. 101. In other situations, had Billy not been "remanded" into jail, he would have been "released on his own recognizance"; however, since, he was brought in the custody of the Office of Mental Health and still subject to a civil status at the state hospital, he would have been brought back to that state hospital. Even if Billy had tried to challenge his civil inpatient legal status, it would have been unlikely that he would have been released to the community at that point based on his actions in court. This was an unusual disposition, complicated by the fact that Billy displayed alarming behavior in court.
102. This objection raises the issue of the constitutional rights of a defendant awaiting an IST finding to avoid unintended side effects and the potentially legally prejudicial side effects of medication. See, e.g., Perlin & Schriver, supra note 59, at 402 n.123.
103. In New York, the process of raising competency to stand trial is governed by N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730 (known as fitness to proceed). Under that statute, the prosecutor, defense, or court can raise competency as an issue. See generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730 (McKinney 2011). For persons charged with misdemeanors and who are found incapacitated to stand trial, a final order of observation is issued, the charges are dismissed and the person is sent to a psychiatric hospital for an evaluation to determine if they meet inpatient civil commitment. Id. § 730.40. For persons charged with felonies and found incapacitated to stand trial, a temporary order of observation is issued and he person is sent to a secure psychiatric facility and treated until the person regains capacity, subject to periodic court review of the person's continued confinement. Id. § 730. 50. 
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104
The irony of Billy's case is that he had spent more time in jail than he ever would have served if he had pled guilty to the misdemeanor, 105 and, in the end, he was institutionalized in the same facility from which this saga began where he started about four months prior. This highlights some of the issues surrounding the decision as to whether or not to raise the incompetency status, and why a competent defense attorney may be reluctant to raise issues like the lack of availability of bail, 106 the conditions of institutionalization, the possible iatrogenic or ameliorative impact of psychiatric institutionalization on the defendant, and the length of institutionalization versus the potential length of incarceration.
107 By addressing issues that relate to continuity of care, similar situations as to what occurred with Billy can be avoided, leading optimally to a reduction in unnecessary institutionalization and incarceration, saving time and resources and ensuring due process rights are upheld.
The questions we consider go far beyond those that could be resolved in an individual case. A settlement order has recently been entered in litigation brought by Disability Advocates, Inc. against the New York State Office of Mental Health ("OMH") and Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") seeking to improve the conditions for persons with mental illness in prisons in New York. 108 that the defendants failed to provide adequate mental health services, including necessary inpatient and residential mental health programs, and imposed punishments that aggravated the mental illness of prisoners in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, and the ADA. 109 Part of the settlement required improved mental health treatment, additional beds for mental health hospital and program beds, limits on punishment of prisoners with mental illness, and the elimination of isolated confinement of prisoners with serious mental illness. 110 Yet, despite the terms of this settlement, the treatment of prisoners with serious mental illness in New York state prisons is still problematic, as is the treatment of people in jail, a population not covered in the lawsuit. 111 There is currently pending litigation, Alcantara v. Annucci, brought by prisoners (sex offenders) who are being housed in "residential treatment facilities" that are actually converted correctional facilities in which prisoners are held beyond their release dates.
112 Under New York corrections law, residential treatment facilities are defined as community based residences in or near a community where employment, educational, and training opportunities are available. 113 Although Alcantara involves sex offenders, the ruling could also affect how persons with mental illness are treated in terms of release from prisons. In addition, prisoners are often sent directly from prison to be civilly committed in a psychiatric hospital after the expiration of their sentence. 114 
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York highlight some of the systemic problems that exist in the treatment of persons with mental illness in prison. Continuity of treatment is not possible when the conditions of mental health treatment are substandard and carried out within a system where the shuttling of persons with mental illness between jails and prisons and hospitals is routine.
IV. RESEARCH ON WHY CONTINUITY OF CARE IS CLINICALLY NECESSARY
Research has shown that continuity of care leads to improvement of clinical and functional outcomes for persons with mental illness. 115 Persons with fewer gaps in mental health service have better rehabilitative outcomes. 116 Further, continuity of care health initiatives contribute to lower health care costs by reducing the rate of psychiatric hospitalization. 117 In addition, receipt of outpatient mental health services is associated with reduced risks of arrests, at least in the near future.
118
The transition from prison to community for a person with mental illness can lead to negative outcomes, including homelessness, higher suicide rate, and higher risk of overdose for those prisoners with substance abuse problems.
119 A 2007 study involving local prisons in London found that continuity of care for prisoners with serious mental illnesses can be improved by working with the individuals prior to release to identify their needs and assisting them in engaging in necessary agencies in the community. 120 In addition, it is important for mental health treatment to begin during incarceration because treatment gains coupled with concomitant services in the community are likely to decrease recidivism, criminally or psychiatrically, for the offender. 121 It is also essential for offenders with mental illness to receive services upon incarceration in order to eliminate any gaps in service and improve outcomes.
V. LEGAL ARGUMENTS
There are legal issues that both support and complicate continuity of care efforts. In this section, we first discuss the legal right to continuity of care, and then we address some complications that may arise regarding a person's individual rights in the context of systemic problematic issues within the healthcare system.
A. Right to Continuity of Care
Not only has valid and reliable behavioral research shown why continuity of care is important, but it is also legally mandated. It has long been established that prisoners have a right to mental health treatment while incarcerated. 123 Providing such services ensures that correctional facilities remain safe for inmates and staff and that persons with mental illness assimilate into the correctional facility and back into society upon their release.
124
Courts have also recognized the importance of continuity of care for prisoners reentering the community. 
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"unambiguously extends to state prison inmates." 128 Thus it logically follows that if the ADA applies both to community integration and inmates, then persons with disabilities are guaranteed the right to continuity of care. Absent reasonable accommodations, prisoners with disabilities are less likely to benefit from prison activities that can reduce recidivism and "are more vulnerable to misunderstanding and exploitation by other prisoners and correctional staff" increasing the likelihood of present and future injury. 129 Courts, however, are split on whether the ADA requires police officers to accommodate an individual's disability upon arrest. 130 While the Supreme Court in City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan did not directly decide the question as to whether the ADA applies to arrests, the Court did state that arrests would be subject to Title II if the arrest is an activity in which the arrestee participates or may benefit from and if that failure to arrest the individual in a manner that reasonably accommodates the disability constitutes discrimination.
131
Although this question of whether the ADA applies to arrests has not been decided by the Supreme Court on the merits, there are advocacy and law enforcement agencies that have already identified the importance of this issue and taken steps to implement more accommodating policies and practices. 132 Comprehensive police officer training can enable officers to make accurate individualized assessments about the level of threat posed and the best way to modify police procedures to accommodate the 128. Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213 (1998); see Perlin, supra note 2, at 221-22 (noting that Yeskey found that the ADA's language "unmistakably includes State prisons and prisoners within its coverage," and that the law contained no "exception that could cast the coverage of prisons into doubt" (quoting Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 209) individual. 133 The most common method of safely accommodating persons with mental disabilities is through the use of a Crisis Intervention Team which has been shown to reduce the incidence of arrest by as much as nineteen percent. 134 Finally, as we discuss subsequently, 135 there is also an obligation under the CRPD to accommodate persons with disabilities and the failure to do so constitutes discrimination.
136
B. Legal Issues Potentially Complicating Continuity of Care
Continuity of care should never override individual rights, especially the right to medical privacy and the right to refuse treatment. Treatment providers have to balance the ability to share information to allow for more effective treatment with the patient's right to privacy. Due to the ease of accessing electronic medical records, a patient's history can "follow the person" throughout hospitalizations,, and these records can include various diagnoses, the number of times a patient has been psychiatrically hospitalized, the psychotropic medication they have taken, and any seclusion or restraint experiences. 137 Mistakes in the medical record can mutate as information is often copied over into multiple databases, making it nearly impossible for the patient to correct. 138 The right to privacy is especially important for persons with mental illness because of the stigma and shame that surrounds mental illness. 
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HIPAA governs whether covered entities, such as hospitals or medical facilities, can disclose protected health information ("PHI") to other parties. 140 In general, HIPAA prevents covered entities from disclosing PHI except in certain prescribed circumstances. 141 In New York, the highest court has held that admitting medical records from other hospitalizations without notice or consent of the patient in an assisted outpatient treatment proceeding, is a violation of HIPAA.
142 While HIPAA provides important protection of medical privacy, some family members of persons with mental illness argue that HIPAA prevents them from being able to adequately care for their loved ones.
143
Health insurance coverage can determine which psychotropic medications 144 are available both in in-patient and out-patient settings. 145 The ACA greatly expanded and overhauled health care coverage for persons in the US, and required that all individuals either obtain minimum essential coverage through employer-sponsored health programs, an individual health plan, or government health plan, or face a financial penalty in form of a tax. 146 It was designed to expand coverage of mental health and substance use disorder benefits at parity with medical coverage. 148 Marketplaces were also created in order to assist people in comparing competing health programs. 149 The ACA also expanded Medicaid eligibility for individuals.
150
Although the ACA does not directly address medical care for prisoners, there are ways that the ACA can benefit inmates and formerly incarcerated individuals.
151 "ACA reforms pave the way for new and stronger partnerships among those institutions involved in correctional health and community health."
152 The ACA also allows for the enrollment of individuals who are incarcerated pending the disposition of charges. 153 Further, the expansion of individual insurance coverage should lead to broader benefits including the reduction of infectious diseases and lower rates of drug use and re-arrest.
154
The Psychiatric Services and Clinical Knowledge Enhancement System ("PSYCKES") is an online database in New York that contains information on persons who receive Medicaid. It is designed to identify individuals who could benefit from clinical review and provide help to treatment providers to develop treatment plans.
155 PSYCKES uses information from Medicaid claims data such as history of illnesses or injuries, outpatient services, medications, hospital services, labs performed, 156 and information that comes from consumers who are subject to courtordered assisted outpatient treatment plans.
157
Although this all appears to be salutary and geared toward greater continuity of care, PSYCKES nonetheless raises multiple important ethical issues that cannot be ignored. For example, PSYCKES begs the question of whether or not it fair for only individuals on Medicaid to be subject to such a database whereas 
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anyone with private health insurance would not be part of the database and whether this information be used as evidence in cases in which patients challenge their hospital retention or assert their right to refuse medication? 158 PSYCKES thus highlights the need to balance medical privacy rights with the need to facilitate continuity of care through the electronic sharing of medical information. A careful balance must be achieved, protecting individual rights for all individuals, no matter whether the individual in question receives Medicaid or has private insurance.
C. Advance Psychiatric Directives 159
Advance psychiatric directives can be used in order to address continuity of care issues. A psychiatric advance directive is a legally enforceable document that specifies the manner in which treatment decisions are to be made in the event the person later becomes incompetent. 160 It can specify both who should make treatment decisions and also what specific treatment should be administered, including psychiatric medication, in the event of incapacity.
161 In theory, it should "follow" the person no matter where they are hospitalized or incarcerated. 162 In order to execute a psychiatric advance directive, an individual must have the ability to: understand and appreciate the risks and benefits of treatment; engage in rational deliberation; and understand the meaning and significance of the delegation. 163 The use of these psychiatric advance directives may have significant therapeutic value. 164 Such directives can empower persons with mental illness to have control over their treatment 158. Information from PSYCKES is regularly contained in patient's medical records that are admitted into evidence when a patient is subject to a civil proceeding like a retention hearing or treatment over objection hearing. PSYCKES is also unavailable to patient's attorneys. REV. 57, 81 (1996) . and may encourage their clinicians to treat them with dignity and respect, rather than paternalistically. 165 They can foster a more collaborative model of care for psychiatric treatment and encourage voluntary treatment. 166 They may also avoid the need for a judicial finding of incapacity 167 and could avoid the need for a guardian. 168 Nevertheless, psychiatric advance directives raise serious ethical issues when the issue of potential revocation is raised. 169 The most important issue to be considered is whether psychiatric advance directives should override the constitutional right to refuse medication. 170 This issue applies not just to persons facing institutionalization but also persons with mental illness who are in the criminal justice system. 171 Some psychiatric advance directives purport to be irrevocable which can cause particular problems for patients who have chosen to be treated with specific medication.
172
Even if refusing psychiatric treatment may limit the person's ability to act autonomously and even to lose competency, the person may authoritatively choose that course of action while still competent.
173
Psychiatric advance directives also create issues when a treating clinician who is unfamiliar with the patient and is reluctant to administer the patient's specific treatment, 174 or does not think following the patient's advance directives would be in 165 177 Furthermore, patients may be subject to coercion with regard to their decision-making as to whether or not to accept a psychiatric advance directive.
178
In an ideal world, psychiatric advance directives could provide a meaningful way for clients to direct their care according to their own wishes, leading to more congruity between their quality of life in the community and that quality posthospitalization. 179 Advance directives can be a tool used to help patients advocate for consistent treatment that is both voluntary and based on decisions made when the person had the capacity to make such decisions. By having clear directives in writing, persons with mental illness can dictate exactly what treatment they would agree to, including specific medications they are willing or unwilling to take, no matter where they are being treated and even if they are dealing with different treatment providers. This can thus avoid many of the issues that arise when persons with mental illness shuttle between hospitals, jails, and the community, and, as a result, lack consistent treatment.
VI. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 180
One of the most important legal theoretical developments of the past three decades has been the creation and dynamic growth of therapeutic jurisprudence. 181 presents a new model for assessing the impact of case law and legislation, recognizing that, as a therapeutic agent, the law can have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences. 182 Therapeutic jurisprudence asks whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due process principles. 183 David Wexler clearly identifies how the tension inherent in this inquiry must be resolved: "the law's use of mental health information to improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] impinge upon justice concerns." 184 Such an inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not mean that "therapeutic concerns 'trump' civil rights and civil liberties." 185 
2018]
THE RIGHT TO CONTINUITY OF CARE 483 therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when consistent with other values served by law should attempt to bring about healing and wellness."
188
In other words, therapeutic jurisprudence supports an ethic of care.
189
The question to be posed here is this: does our current system comply with these precepts of therapeutic jurisprudence? Remarkably, this is an inquiry that has been considered only once before in legal scholarship. 190 In that instance, Rebecca Spain Broches concluded-with total accuracy-that "criminal justice system procedures that disrupt the course of treatment are contrary to the vision, developed by therapeutic jurisprudence and adopted by this paper, that law should further therapeutic ends." 191 Broches points out that disruption in continuity of care makes relapse or decompensation more likely, 192 and that criminal justice system procedures that disrupt the course of treatment are "contrary to the vision, developed by therapeutic jurisprudence . . . that law should further therapeutic ends." 193 We agree entirely with Broches, and suggest that her findings be the first building block in the creation of new policies that break the cycle of continuity-disruption. Using the words of an important report by the Rutgers Center for Behavioral Health Services and Criminal Justice Research, we also acknowledge that each individual in question "having [both] a serious mental illness and entanglements with the justice system, is more than an illness or an offender." 194 can begin to apply therapeutic jurisprudence insights to this problem in ways that might, in fact, begin to ameliorate the woeful situation that we face.
To do this effectively, we must demand that the discharge procedures in place actually serve the individual so as to provide a foundation for successful reentry.
196 These procedures must be ones that will help determine whether any "mental health gains made during incarceration will translate into the outside world" 197 Although there has been some notable litigation that has resulted in jail officials being ordered to arrange discharge planning services for inmates with mental illness being released into the community, 198 there has been a paucity of such litigation in the cases of prison release.
199
These points are not novel and have previously been considered. Over twenty years ago, Professor James Ogloff and his colleagues advocated that community mental health centers provide assessments and treatment services while an inmate is in prison and services following release if the inmate remains in the local community. 200 Subsequent studies demonstrated that continuity was also significantly associated with a better quality of life, better community functioning, lower severity of symptoms, and greater service satisfaction. 201 Yet, still today, the evidence is clear that prisons have continuously failed to provide adequate 
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mental health care services for inmates with mental illness, 202 a failure that mocks the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence.
Empirically, there is no question that evidence shows that therapeutic jurisprudence "works" in reducing post-release recidivism by promoting "active and productive community participation by ex-offenders." 203 For example, in a work release project in Delaware sponsored by the National Institute on Drug Abuse, prisoners who participated in prison-based treatment and post-release care "were seven times more likely to be drug-free and three times more likely to be arrest-free after three years than those who received no treatment." 204 Another study concluded that reentry programs "had a larger effect on recidivism when they lasted long enough (thirteen weeks or more) and provided continuity of care (had multiple phases, beginning in the institution and extending into the community upon release)." 205 Such post-release care, again, comports with therapeutic jurisprudence principles.
206
As previously discussed, the clear evidence of the value of continuity of care-how it improves post-release engagement with mental health services, 207 how transition planning facilitates such continuity of care, 208 and how a correctional system that adopts such transitional services can have a "direct effect" on post-release physical and mental health 209 -is totally consonant with therapeutic jurisprudence values.
VII. MENTAL HEALTH COURTS
Consider the potential role of "mental health courts" ("MHCs") as a partial remedy for the problems that we have been discussing. 210 Indisputably, one of the most important developments in the past two decades in the treatment of criminal defendants with mental illness within the criminal justice system is the creation and the expansion of mental health courts. Mental health courts are a kind of "problem-solving court," 211 and their importance grows as society come to grips with how badly it has failed to provide the sort of continuity of care that should be required legally, ethically and morally. 212 There is a wide range of dispositional alternatives available to judges in these cases, 213 and an even wider range of judicial attitudes. 214 
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These courts offer a radically new approach to the problems at hand. 215 They offer an approach that incorporates an articulated focus on dignity, 216 that optimally embrace of therapeutic jurisprudence, and that focus on procedural justice, and uses of the principles of restorative justice. 217 We believe that we need to begin to take seriously the potential ameliorative impact of such courts on the ways that continuity of care can meaningfully be provided to criminal defendants with mental disabilities. 218 
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It needs to be stressed that such courts are set up differently in different jurisdictions. Although there is not one single prototype of MHCs, 219 virtually all include the creation of a special docket that is handled by a particular judge, with the primary goal of diverting defendants from the criminal justice system and into treatment. 220 As part of the commitment of these courts to team approaches, 221 representatives from justice and treatment agencies assist the judge in screening offenders to determine whether they would present a risk of violence if released to the community, in devising appropriate treatment plans, and in supervising and monitoring the individual's performance in treatment. 222 
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The MHC judge functions as part of a mental health team that decides whether the individual has treatment needs and can be safely released into the community. 223 First, the team formulates a treatment plan; then, a court-employed case manager and court monitor track the individual's participation in the treatment program and submit periodic reports to the judge concerning his or her progress. 224 Participants are required to report to the court periodically so that the judge can monitor treatment compliance. 225 Moreover, additional status review hearings are held on an as-needed basis.
226 These courts provide "nuanced" approaches, 227 and may signal a "fundamental shift" in the criminal justice system.
228
By increasing the likelihood of a person with mental disability being diverted out of the criminal justice system, such courts both make it less likely that the person with mental disabilities will suffer at the hands of others because of their status, 229 and make it more likely that continuity of care can be achieved in their cases. The non-coercive nature and dignitarian values of MHCs result in a more favorable response to offered care from defendants. 230 When these courts "buy into" the precepts of therapeutic jurisprudence, their likelihood of success is enhanced. 231 "Even a well-resourced problem-solving court may not work if the judge fails to adopt therapeutic jurisprudence and other problem-solving strategies effectively." 232 Furthermore, if MHC judges "selectively apply, blend and transform" elements from the treatment and legal spheres to adjudicate cases therapeutically so as to "generate more effective solutions," 233 it is more likely that authentically meaningful continuity of care can be maintained. 234 
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Finally, and most importantly, research also suggests that mental health court participation increases access to and utilization of mental health care, 235 reduces the use of crisis or high-intensity services, and reduces substance use. 236 The most recent relevant study-authored by a sitting trial judge-has concluded that "problem-solving treatment courts are the best way to supervise criminal defendants in the community who present both high needs and a high risk to re-offend absent intervention." 237 In short, they are the best way to ensure that continuity of care is actually provided. 
VIII. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
A. Introduction
It is essential for those who are concerned with the questions that we raise in this paper to take a hard look at international human rights law, 239 especially the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ("CRPD"). 240 Although this may appear counter-intuitive-given the United States' record of failing to ratify the most important human rights treaties of the past decade 241 -we argue that, given the fact that President Obama signed the CRPD, 242 the United States is now obligated by the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, which requires signatories "to refrain from acts which would defeat [CRPD's] object and purpose." 243 In this section, we initially consider the CRPD and how it has created a new framework of disability, looking briefly at the key articles for the purpose of this paper. We then argue that continuity of care, as we described it here, is required by international human rights law.
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B. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ("CRPD"): Moving Toward a New Framework of Disability 244
The CRPD "is regarded as having finally empowered the 'world's largest minority' to claim their rights, and to participate in international and national affairs on an equal basis with others who have achieved specific treaty recognition and protection." 245 This Convention is the most revolutionary international human rights document ever created that applies to persons with disabilities.
246
The Convention furthers the human rights approach to disability and recognizes the right of people with disabilities to equality in almost every aspect of life. 247 It firmly endorses a social model of disability, a clear and direct repudiation of the medical model that traditionally was part-andparcel of mental disability law.
248 "The Convention responds to traditional models, situates disability within a social model framework, and sketches the full range of human rights that apply to all human beings, all with a particular application to the lives of persons with disabilities." 249 It provides a framework for ensuring that mental health laws "fully recognize the rights of those with mental illness." 250 There is no question that it has "ushered in a new era of disability rights policy." 251 
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The CRPD calls for "respect for inherent dignity" 252 and "non-discrimination."
253 Subsequent articles declare "freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," 254 "freedom from exploitation, violence and abuse," 255 and a right to protection of the "integrity of the person." 256 It not only clarifies that states should not discriminate against persons with disabilities, but also explicitly sets out the many steps that states must take to create an enabling environment so that persons with disabilities can enjoy authentic equality in society. 257 The CRPD mandates that "States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity."
258 Elsewhere, the Convention commands:
States Parties shall ensure effective access to justice for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others, including through the provision of procedural and age-appropriate accommodations, in order to facilitate their effective role as direct and indirect participants, including as witnesses, in all legal proceedings, including at investigative and other preliminary stages.
259
Other articles in the CRPD speak directly to the questions under consideration in this paper. The Convention requires, by way of example, that "States Parties shall promote appropriate training for those working in the field of administration of justice, including police and prison staff." 260 In an important article about Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, the CRPD provides an affirmative right to health care, finding that member States must:
(a) Provide persons with disabilities with the same range, quality and standard of free or affordable health care and programmes as provided to other persons, including in the area of sexual and reproductive health and population-based public health programmes; (b) Provide those health services needed by persons with disabilities specifically because of their disabilities, including early identification and intervention as appropriate, and services designed to minimize and prevent further disabilities, including among children and older persons; (c) Provide these health services as close as possible to people's own communities, including in rural areas; (d) Require health professionals to provide care of the same quality to persons with disabilities as to others, including on the basis of free and informed consent by, inter alia, raising awareness of the human rights, dignity, autonomy and needs of persons with disabilities through training and the promulgation of ethical standards for public and private health care; 261. Lord, supra note 136, at 54. 262. Id. at 69.
(e) Prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities in the provision of health insurance, and life insurance where such insurance is permitted by national law, which shall be provided in a fair and reasonable manner; [and] (f) Prevent discriminatory denial of health care or health services or food and fluids on the basis of disability.
263
The ratification of the CRPD marks the most important development ever seen in institutional human rights law for persons with mental disabilities. 264 The CRPD is detailed, comprehensive, integrated, and is the result of a careful drafting process. It seeks to reverse the results of centuries of oppressive behavior and attitudes that have stigmatized persons with disabilities. 265 Its goals are clear: to promote, protect, and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity. 266 Whether these goals can actually be accomplished is still far from a settled matter.
Professor Meghan Flynn has argued that these Articles "guarantee persons with disabilities rights to enjoy freedom from institutionalization and live in the community setting of their choice."
267 If Professor Flynn is correct-as we believe she isthen, clearly, continuity of care must be considered as a fundamental right under the CRPD. In an earlier article about juvenile punishment facilities, one of the co-authors has argued that "our current system of warehousing juveniles with mental illnesses in juvenile detention facilities and reformatories and in prisons following pre-adjudication transfers violates international 263 This analysis applies equally to the cohort that we discuss in this paper.
Historically, there has traditionally been robust literature about the relationship between correctional facilities and international human rights law. 269 But there has, to this date, been no scholarship at all that considers the application of international human rights law to the need for continuity of care that we discuss in this paper. A consideration of the relevant Articles of the CRPD makes it clear that our current policies (not providing the sort of continuity of care that would protect the persons in question from "exploitation, violence and abuse," 270 and not guaranteeing the right to protection of the "integrity of the person") 271 violate international human rights law. If we are to provide "authentic equality"
272 to this population so that they can truly "enjoy freedom from institutionalization," 273 then we must reconceptualize these policies and provide the sort of continuity of care that we urge here. An important article some fifteen years ago by the former Director of the National Institute of Justice and his colleagues asked, "Has the health care system in prison created linkages with the health care system in the returning prisoner's community to ensure continuity of care?" 274 If we cannot answer this question today in the affirmative (and we cannot), then we fail under prevailing international human rights law standards. 275 Writing about the plight of incarcerated women in California, Angela Wolf and her colleagues have recommended that "[c]ommunity programs should link to in-prison programs to provide continuity of care so as to meet women's basic needs upon release, such as subsistence, shelter, and health care." 276 Each of these is mandated by the CRPD 277 and as such, policies that do not include a robust continuity-of-care program thus violate the document.
IX. WAYS TO IMPROVE CONTINUITY OF CARE
There are many ways that the quality of continuity of care can be improved. Initially, diversion programs keep persons with mental illness away from the criminal justice system and instead place them on special mental health-oriented tracks. 278 Diversion can occur at various stages including prior to arrest or after arrest. 279 Certainly, well-operating MHCs 280 are a proven means of improving diversion, leading to better outcomes for the cohort of individuals involved. 281 Additionally, providing mental health screening for every arrestee can lead to that person being diverted into mental health treatment. 282 The initial intake interview is a critical component of effective mental health treatment as it allows officials to ascertain whether the person was receiving treatment in the community, and also connects inmates with treatment, especially in those cases where they were not receiving adequate treatment in the community. 283 Mental health screening should be validated to accurately identify mental illness. 284 The intake process should be formulated to identify how a prisoner's areas of need overlap, such as mental illness and unemployment or educational issues. 285 Mental health screenings should also be administered routinely upon any transfer between prisons, upon admission to a segregation unit within a prison, and also on an ad-hoc basis. 286 In addition, mental health screening should include assessment of suicidal risk. 287 Improving conditions in prisons and jails can also improve continuity of care for persons with mental illness. 288 Proper mental health training for corrections officers can also help identify inmates should they need mental health treatment during their incarceration and ensure that the interactions between staff and inmates with mental illness are therapeutic. 289 Punitive treatment like segregation and use of restraints should be eliminated. 290 In addition, psychiatric rehabilitation programs are needed including education and vocational training, social skills training, anger management, and substance abuse treatment. 291 Intermediate care, between inpatient and outpatient treatment, is also a crucial component. 292 
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Beyond this, discharge planning is also an important point to ensure that a person continues to receive proper mental health care in the community. 293 Discharge plans must be tailored towards individual needs and must be culturally relevant. 294 Aftercare programs are not always adequate or sufficient, and it is important that inmates work with discharge planners for longer periods of time prior to release in order to ensure a smooth transition. 295 Comprehensive transitional services provide access to mental health treatment, job opportunities, family unification, and cognitive skills training. 296 It is also important to make sure the individual has the ability to pay for mental health services and medication upon release. 297 Finally, the availability and quality of community mental health treatment should be improved to address continuity of care issues. 298 The key to quality and effective mental health care is the relationship between the provider and the consumer receiving services. 299 Increasing the availability of educational and vocational training and mental health and substance use treatment increases the chance of successful reentry and reduces recidivism. 300 The first days and weeks that an inmate is released are crucial in that the inmate poses the most danger to themselves, their families, and peers. 301 By investing greater resources in using this vulnerable time to achieve socially desirable outcomes, public health workers can interrupt the cycle of relapse and recidivism.
302
Of course, more research is still needed to determine the most effective social interventions. 303 
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X. CONCLUSION
The right to continuity of care is guaranteed under both domestic and international law. Providing effective continuity of care for persons with mental illness can lead to better outcomes and reduce the shuttle of this population between jails and hospitals. However, there are many factors complicating the issue of continuity of care with no easy solutions. Currently the constant shuttling treatment of the current, relevant population is in violation of the ADA, the CRPD, and therapeutic jurisprudence principles. The ADA guarantees freedom from discrimination based on disability and applies both to persons in the community and individuals who are incarcerated, guaranteeing a right to continuity of care. Yet individuals also have a right to medical privacy, as HIPAA prevents medical information from being shared except in certain prescribed circumstances. Furthermore, although the ACA has greatly expanded access to health care, it currently does not apply to incarcerated individuals. Health insurance can complicate issues of continuity of care in cases where only certain treatment providers or medications are covered for the individual.
Continuity of care can be improved through interventions through the use of MHCs, diversion practices, mental health screening, and, potentially, the use of psychiatric advance directives. More research is needed to determine what interventions work best for this population. Better training for corrections employees, court personnel, lawyers, judges, and police officers can lead to better therapeutic outcomes. 304 Our title comes in part from Bob Dylan's masterpiece Visions of Johanna. Writing about that song, Tim Riley has characterized it as "rich with psychological peril." 305 Critic Mike Marqusee has characterized Visions as "Dylan's definitive treatment of 'strandedness.'" 306 The cohort of individuals we write about here are in persistent "psychological peril," and, whether they are in a correctional facility, a hospital or on the street, they 
